

INTRO.....	2
UVF did not have the capacity (Acting Alone) for Dublin.....	3
Not based on Speculation.....	3
Styles and Wylde.....	4
VICTIMS and THE BOMBS.....	4
Killing Years .....	10
MOUNTBATTEN .....	10
Shot at by the Provos.....	13
1972 BOMBS.....	14
Criminal Investigation Methodology .....	15
To do this Operation.....	16
BOMB SIGNATURE .....	17
ANFO 1 .....	18
ANFO 2.....	18
Wilson briefing Cosgrave .....	20
Judge Barron 2003 Criticises Dublin Government .....	21
Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave Left no Public record.....	21
Investigators Perspective.....	22
HIDDEN HAND DOCUMENTARY 1993.....	22
First Class Research.....	23
Good Friday Agreement but No to Public Sworn Inquiry .....	23
Judge Corey.....	24
ARDAGH Committee .....	25
Secretary of State declined to attend.....	26
Military Experts Styles and Wylde .....	26
Next question. ....	28
MONAGHAN = ANFO 1 .....	29
DUBLIN = ANFO 2 .....	29
NO RECORDS OF SEIZURES OR DESTRUCTION .....	30
And that's not based on speculation, .....	30
After the Inquiries .....	31
DUBLIN APPEALS TO THE BRITISH.....	31
British have a long-term political and security strategy.....	32
UK Supreme Court.....	33
CLOSING THE DOOR ON INFORMATION.....	33
GASLIGHTING 1 .....	34
The role of Jon Boutcher.....	34
Podcast by Belfast Telegraph.....	35
Job Boutcher Doubles Down on UVF Bombing Capability.....	36
Gaslighting 2 .....	37
British Army intelligence gathering.....	39
Importance of Forensic Information .....	39

Logic .....	43
Safety and Arming Unit .....	44
Britain has closed the Door on information release .....	46
Exception to the Rule of NOT doing our own investigation .....	47
WHY BELTURBET? And NOT DUBLIN AND MONAGHAN.....	47
Secret.....	47
Convenient scapegoat.....	48

## **DID THE UVF ACT ALONE Irish Cop Investigates The Worst Attack of The Troubles**

### **John O' Brien**

## **INTRO**

[Speaker 2] (0:00 - 0:04)

Retired, retired Garda, John O'Brien. Thanks for joining me.

[Speaker 1 John O'Brien] (0:04 - 0:05)

Ah, good afternoon, John. My pleasure.

[Speaker John Hadden] (0:06 - 0:22)

Okay, so you're here today, you've written a book on the subject, but you're here to basically lay out the case that for the atrocious Dublin Monaghan bombings, and the UVF, the people who carried it out, could not in fact have acted alone.

[Speaker 1] (0:22 - 2:28)

Thank you, John. Well, I joined the Garda Síochána way back in 1968, if anybody remembers back that far. So my career in the Guards literally mirrored the period of the Troubles, and then some more.

So like a lot of the things that we're talking about today, I was actually stationed in Dublin at that time, and subsequently I was in the border and other places. What I call my book, which is The Great Deception, the Dublin and Monaghan car bombings but more correctly, it should be labelled as Mass Murder. 34 people were killed.

## UVF did not have the capacity (Acting Alone) for Dublin

You hit a very good point in your introduction, which is that UVF did not have the capacity for Dublin. They had the capacity for Monaghan, and a little later in our chat, I'll be explaining the difference between A and B. But in relation to Dublin, and this is very, very important, and not because I say so, because the facts say so.

What I've said after, I've been researching this in one shape or another, I guess for about 20 years now. I've written many other books about the Guards, but every book I've written up to the last one had a chapter on the Dublin and Monaghan bombings.

**But anyway, to cut to the chase, the UVF acting alone, UVF acting alone, which is very important, did not possess the technical, the operational, or the organisational capacity to execute the Dublin car bombings of May 17, 1974.**

## Not based on Speculation

And I just very quickly say, the argument is not based on speculation, but on four key things. A layered accumulation of forensic findings, which has to do with the type of bomb used. Expert military testimony, which I'll be sharing with you in a little while. Comparisons with the UVF's historical bombing record.

And the last one, and again, very important, an analysis of the sophisticated planning required for the Dublin operation. They are the four key things on which the premise is based, and there is absolute evidence to support that contention.

And I look forward to getting into that with you, John, as we move down through the story.

[Speaker 2] (2:28 - 2:56)

Something we'll come back to again and again, and it stands out for me as being one of the most convincing points, is that the UVF before and after never had a bombing that was as, we'll say successful, they meant to kill a lot of civilians, and they did. So I guess that makes it

successful from that point of view. But they never had a bombing that was, for lack of a better term, as good, again, as well carried out and as professional.

## Styles and Wylde

[Speaker 1] (2:57 - 4:33)

And John, one of our key witnesses, George Styles, Lieutenant Colonel George Styles, in some detail, which we'll hear in a little while, actually underlines that point, because he was in Belfast in 1969 to 1972, and he's followed by another British Lieutenant Colonel, also operating the explosive field, Lieutenant Colonel Nigel Wylde . So we would be looking specifically at their quotes in relation to that. So that's the basic thing.

## VICTIMS and THE BOMBS

But maybe I should just share briefly with our listeners, John, what happened in the, precisely by way of the bombing explosions. We can look at the logistical issues. 17th of May, 1974, it was a Friday.

In Dublin, it was a bright, sunny day. Coming up on half past five, it was a bus strike in Dublin. People were endeavouring to get out of the city, as you would want to do on a Friday evening, get home and do their things.

### *PARNELL STREET TALBOT STREET SOUTHLEINSTER STREET*

And at 28 minutes past five, a car bomb exploded in Parnell Street, followed very shortly after that at half past five in Talbot Street in Dublin. And then two minutes later, South Linster Street in Dublin.

### *MONAGHAN*

And then finally, about an hour later, a different type of car bomb exploded in Monaghan.

So that's basically what happened. Thirty-four people were murdered on that day. Ten of those were killed in Parnell Street.

Fifteen were killed in Talbot Street. Two women, two unfortunate women, were killed in South Linster Street. That's all in Dublin.

And seven were killed in Monaghan. And there was over something in the region of 300 injured in that explosion. Now, there's a wider context, John, but I'll take your lead on that.

[Speaker 2] (4:33 - 4:47)

Absolutely. I think a good place to start might be like some of the personal stories that you know of members of An Garda Síochána, who are kind of, I guess, unfortunate enough to be on duty that day.

[Speaker 1] (4:47 - 12:51)

Yes, indeed. And I was involved in an old history project way back in 2024, which was a lead into the anniversary of the bombings. And I interviewed a number of colleagues who were working on that day.

But the first thing I want to mention is the victims. And one particular family, because the name is the same as my own, were wiped out in Parnell Street in Dublin. That's the O'Brien family.

That's John, the father, who was 24 years of age. Anna, who was 22. Jacqueline was 17 months, and little baby Anne-Marie was five months.

And there's a particular backstory to that, like it really is very, very, very hard to bear. Anne-Marie was only five months, was attending the Rotunda Hospital, which is quite close to where the Parnell Street bomb exploded. I think she had five visits.

She was suffering from, as some young babies were, a displacement in her hips. And there was a procedure that they did there. And there was a very kind nurse there who was there, if you like, almost their personal physician.

And because she was there so often, you know, over a four or five week period, a bit of a bond had developed between the family, John O'Brien and his wife, Anne, and obviously the

little kids. And the nurse, Anne, who dealt with them there, said Anne-Marie was never a bother. She always smiled.

She was only five months old, but she was very easy to work with. The reality was that family were due to come back to the Rotunda Hospital on the following Friday, John, on the following Friday. And the nurse who was looking after them had a little interchange with them, and they wanted to know what she was doing for the weekend.

And she confessed that she had bought a new gúna, or in English, a new dress, and she had a very hot date that she was looking forward to. So that was the spirit in which they left, and they were to return on the following Friday. Now, the nurse made her own way home, and her story of going home through what was happening in Dublin in the next 20 minutes or so is its own story.

But on the following Friday, she was in the hospital again, and she was waiting at the time around four o'clock for the O'Brien family to show up. And of course, the O'Brien family didn't show up. The four of them, John, it is horrible to say, were wiped out in Parnell Street.

They were wiped out in Parnell Street literally minutes after they had left the Rotunda Hospital. Now, on Parnell Street was a good friend of mine, a guard at the time, Michael McKenna. Michael was doing what we call point duty, you know, directing traffic.

And he actually experienced the Parnell Street bomb, car bomb exploding in real time. He literally saw, heard, and felt the explosion. He saw some of the casualties fall on the street who were killed.

So he experienced it firsthand, and it left a permanent mark with him, he said, for all of his service after that. He rushed down the street from where he was. He was at the junction of O'Connell Street at the Parnell Monument, and he ran down towards the scene of the explosion.

And some people may not be familiar with people, police who did the point duty, directed traffic, wore armlets, white armlets, you know, to make it easier for the traffic to see them. He didn't have any first aid on him, and he whipped off the armlets to try to stem the flow of

blood from some of the people who were lying on the street. This was an extremely, extremely horrendous situation for him.

And again, and by the way, there was no counselling in those days either. But the other person I want to share the story with as well for Parnell Street is a colleague called John Mulligan. John was at Holman Swords, north of the airport in Dublin.

He heard the bombing, and he went into his station, which is the Bridewell in Dublin. So he drove in, he did like a good guard, a good police officer should have done. He went in to help, and he was sent to the Richmond Hospital to help with the casualties there.

And he describes what he saw there, and bodies lying on the floor, some of them already dead, and so on. And he facilitated bringing some of the deceased down to the city morgue. And I'm going to skip the details, John, on it, because it's better left to the imagination than in the telling.

And again, his wife says that he wasn't the same for something like a couple of months afterwards, because he was right in the middle of something. In Talbot Street, another colleague of mine, Matt Givens, again in the same oral history project that I did, gave a first-hand account. And by the way, 15 people were killed in Talbot Street.

15. Matt was walking down Talbot Street from O'Connor Street. And O'Connor Street, for those that don't know, which is the main street, is at right angles to Talbot Street.

So you're walking down the leg of the T, if you like. And he spoke to his colleague in front of Gainey's shop on Talbot Street, and that's where the car bomb exploded a very short time later. And he persuaded a colleague to come with him.

They were going for the tea, as they would say in Ireland, and it was break time. And they had got down to the end of the street when the bomb exploded, when the car bomb exploded. They ran back up, and he describes a scene that he found there.

Just share one quick memory that he shared with me, and there's much more that he shared, but just this one. There was an old lady lying on the ground near Morton's Hotel, and it was

obvious that one of her legs was very seriously injured. And she said, ah, no, Gar, no, no, no, don't bother with me.

Go to the other people that are seriously injured. I'm all right. And he then also went to Jervis Street Hospital, another central city hospital at that time.

And again, he was there with the same kind of scene that was described by Michael McKenna and John Mulligan, in terms of what they saw on film. Now, I don't have any colleague that spoke in South Leinster Street, but I know the two unfortunate women were killed there. In Monaghan, seven people were killed in Monaghan.

Joe Sullivan, another colleague, again in the same oral History Project, gave his account of the story. It's a very heart-moving story, because Joe was a country guard, later a superintendent, and he was outside the town of Monaghan when he heard the bang, the actual explosion. Anyone who has been near it will understand the sound.

If you haven't, it's a horrendous sound. He got back into Monaghan, and he found that on North Road in Monaghan, just in front of Greacen's Pub, was a scene of utter devastation. There had been a wooden building quite close on the street.

That was in Smithereens. The front of Greacen's Pub was demolished, and of the car that was used in that particular episode, only the sump of the car was left. Forensically, later on, part of the timing clock that was used by the UVF was actually found.

A cog wheel from that was found. But again, another story I want to share, John, is that one of the killed in that was a country man. He lived outside the town.

His name was George Williamson. On a Friday, his habit was, he travelled in on his bicycle into Monaghan. He got his provisions, as they call it, and then he put the provisions on the handlebar of his bicycle.

Now, this may be old age to a lot of folks, but anyway, it's what happened in the country. When he had that done, he parked the bike at an entry or a side street close to the pub, and he

went off to have his pint. In the aftermath in Monaghan, Joe Sullivan and other colleagues who were there were trying to put the pieces together.

People were being taken to the Monaghan Hospital. Then somebody noticed George's bike at the corner, and they went to look for George. There was no George.

There was no George because George, at that stage, was in the mortuary or the morgue of the local hospital. Again, a terribly sad story. Totally inoffensive country man getting the provisions.

So, that's just a, I guess, John, just a little small idea of what happened. It happened, of course, to 34 people, not just the people that I mentioned. It should put in people's minds and in context and ask the questions, what happened afterwards by way of following up on that dreadful mass murder?

Was it taken seriously by the Irish government? Was it taken seriously by the British government? And I think in our discussion, we'll be answering some of those questions, John.

[Speaker 2] (12:53 - 13:45)

Indeed. I was going to say it's worth mentioning as well for people who mightn't be as familiar with the bombing. This wasn't one of those where there was a set of targets who might have been like military or security force and civilians happened to get caught.

This was purely targeting civilians. The intention was to maximise civilian death. We'll go into in the Dublin, in the three Dublin ones, it may well have been the case that they might have been given the minute between them.

They may have been trying to get people to go towards the next bomb. I'm not sure you can you can kind of go into that. Do you want to?

Obviously, with anything historical, you can't really examine a particular event without looking at the context around it. I think that might be helpful if you were to kind of lay that out for us.

## Killing Years

[Speaker 1] (13:46 - 20:25)

Yeah, sure. What I call the period from 1969 to 1979, I call it the killing years. And that seems a very callous thing to call it.

But in terms of the Irish history up to that point, that was the that was exactly what happened. The troubles in the north. And of course, it's important for those who may not realise the difference.

We're talking about two separate political entities here, the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, which is part of the United Kingdom. Obviously, the border in between. And the troubles were primarily but certainly not exclusively situated, as we can see from what we're just discussing in the in the north.

The killing years, it started in 1969. I think 20 people were killed in 69. As a result of the troubles, 25 in 1970, 180 in 1971.

And that's the year that internment without trial was introduced in Northern Ireland. And in 1972, which was the highest total of that decade and the worst decade, it was 480 people were killed, 480. And that included the 14 people that were murdered in Derry.

And that's on the afternoon. And the process continued on. And of course, 1974, that we are talking about now, 310 were murdered that particular year.

1976, the British ambassador was murdered in Dublin, a guard was murdered in Portarlinton, in the middle of the country. And the actual death toll began to decline. But in 1979, Lord Mountbatten, who had a holiday home down in Sligo, he was murdered by himself and members of his family were murdered on a boat, I think the Shadow Five, it was just out of the bay where it was in Classiebawn.

## MOUNTBATTEN

And one of the killers was arrested by an unarmed uniformed guard about 40 miles from the scene before the crime had actually happened, which is quite a remarkable feat because the bomber, who was subsequently convicted and spent a lot of time in jail because of the killing, was taken by an unarmed guard on the side of the road about 40 miles away doing a routine checkpoint. Also 1979 was the year, of course, of the killing of the 18 soldiers in one point. Again, the single biggest military loss in Northern Ireland during the trouble.

So that's why I call it the killing years, John. The crisis, of course, was, and I don't want to go into too much detail to overshadow the main story, but the first guard to be murdered in the Republic since the Second World War was a guard, Richard Fallon, who was murdered during a bank raid in Dublin. And two government ministers were fired eventually out of allegations regarding a plot to import arms into the country to go to the North.

So it was a tough political situation as well at the time. I'm just going to kind of fast forward maybe to enough for the point of view of missing out on things. In 1973, at this stage, a lot of provisional IRA and other subversives were being captured in the South and were being sent to prison.

Not often realised because often our Northern brethren think that they were the only place impacted by what was happening. But in the latter end of 1975, or 73, I beg your pardon, there was a helicopter escape from Mountjoy prison. Three escaped.

I think you might be familiar with that story for other reasons. The 11th of March in 74, Senator Billy Fox was murdered on the border. And of course, 74 was also the Dublin Monaghan bombings.

And 74, provisional IRA prisoners escaped from Portlaoise, and I think you would be familiar with that one as well, John. And in 1975, again in the north of Miami showband massacre. And that, of course, had all the elements of collusion that we came to expect.

In 1976, and I kind of stopped my chronology there, John, there was a battering ram attempt to escape, for prisoners to escape from Portlaoise, which was foiled. Garda Michael Clarkin was murdered in a provisional IRA booby trap explosion in Portarlinton. And at that time, the context was the Dublin government, which at that stage was the Fianna Gael and Labour

coalition, were passing new emergency legislation in the Dáil, the Criminal Law Jurisdiction Act and Emergency Powers Act.

And this was seen as a protest, right or wrong from that. By the way, again in July of 78, ~~there was a~~ or 76, the bigger problem, was an escape from the special criminal court in Dublin using explosives. And in the north in 1976, we had the Reavey and O'Dowd killings on the 4th of January, and the Kingsmill massacre on the 5th of January.

One other date I want to mention, which is the 1st of February 1972, two car bombs exploded in Dublin. And again, there was a particular context for this. And I'd like our listeners to maybe get this point.

The Dáil, the Parliament was debating emergency legislation to be enacted against the subversives. And it looked like the legislation wouldn't pass. And two car bombs exploded in Dublin while the Parliament at Dáil was sitting, and the legislation was passed in a hurry.

So, there was a political consequence favourable to certain people that arose from those two car bombs. And again, for the 1974, 17th of May, there was a political consequence for it. Because why?

There was a power sharing executive in place in Belfast, which was there as a result of the Sunningdale Agreement. And after the Dublin bombings, Dublin bombings, that power sharing executive collapsed. By the way, the UVF, the Ulster Volunteer Force, who didn't claim responsibility for the killing until 19 years later, had been de-prescribed in the North.

In other words, they had been brought off the banned list in the North, I think just one week before the Dublin bombings of 1974. So, this is a kind of a whistle-stop tour, John, through the killing 70s. But hopefully, it will give our listeners an opportunity of seeing that a lot was happening in the North, but the consequences were directed in the South as well.

By the way, politically in the South, the only thing that we wanted to do in the early 70s was to join the European Community, the EEC. That was a political objective. But this whole situation changed the whole cast of history in the North, and certainly in the South as well.

[Speaker 2] (20:27 - 20:44)

And just a piece of trivia, actually, for people, zero members of the Irish security forces, this being Army or Gardaí, were ever killed by loyalist paramilitaries. All that were killed were killed by Republicans of some kind. It's worth a mention.

## Shot at by the Provos

[Speaker 1] (20:44 - 21:38)

It's worth a mention, yes. And of course, indeed, I missed something else. In passing, I was a young sergeant in Hackballscross, which is just across the border from Crossmaglen, way back in 79.

Myself and another colleague were shot at by two provisional IRA guys who had been involved in the car bomb in Crossmaglen. And we were unarmed. And we chased after those.

And people said to me afterwards, are you crazy? But it is almost instinctively what you did, John. So yes, it was not an easy place, because we didn't have good, what would be normally called SOPs, Standard Operating Procedures.

And by the same token, the provisional IRA had an Army, General Army Order No. 8, which said they weren't to engage with the security forces in the south. That was honoured in the briefs as well, subsequently, in subsequent years, as well on a couple of occasions.

[Speaker 2] (21:39 - 21:51)

OK, yeah. But back to the actual bombing itself. Do you want to tell us about the few car bombs that the UVF did in the Republic in the lead up to this?

[Speaker 1] (21:51 - 24:11)

Yeah, I can just give an example of that, John. They did very little. I think the total would be something around six.

## 1972 BOMBS<sup>1</sup>

I'm just looking at something to just remind myself of it. I'm looking at a little chart that has them on it, John. It's the 1st of December 1972.

That's the one where the Dail is debating the emergency powers, Eden Quay and Sackville Place in Dublin, and two car bombs. Now, I'm not at all sure from looking at the details of that, that that was carried out solely by the UVF. And I'm not going to go into the details, because we'll just simply detract from the story that we're on.

Again, in December of 72, the UVF was certainly involved in a car bomb in Belturbet. I think the one in Clones and in Clones as well. And there was a parcel bomb in Pettigo.

January of 73, there was a car bomb in the afternoon, All Blacks rugby match in Dublin. And then on the 17th of March, 73, Cloughfin, Castlefin, and the bomber was certainly UDA ~~and~~ UDR. Also, ~~the Finnish President~~ was killed by his own bomb. The three bombs that we mentioned were the 1974, May 74. Subsequently, on the 19th of December of 1975, it's usually referred to as Kays Tavern bombing in Dundalk. And the last one that I have on my list is the 7th of March 1976 in Castleblaney, and the car had been stolen in Belfast.

### Annotated

- 
1. 01/12/1972 – Car bombs at Eden Quay & Sackville Place, Dublin, Cars (Acquired Belfast) Emergency Legislation Dead Locked in Dáil – Passed Quickly after attacks. Very Unlikely UVF
  2. 28/12/1972 – Car bombs at Belturbet & Clones, Cars stolen Enniskillen.
  3. 28/12/1972 - Container Bomb Pettigo
  4. 20/01/1973 – Car bomb at Sackville Place (All Blacks Rugby) Car Acquired Belfast Possible UVF or other Terrorist (Crude Bomb smoking fuse)
  5. 17/03/1973 – Car Bomb Cloughfin, Castlefin, Co. Donegal (Bomber Killed) Car Stolen Castlederg UDA member killed not UVF
  6. 17/05/1974 – 3 Car Bombs Dublin (Cars Acquired Belfast), Sunningdale Agreement Protests - Northern Ireland in chaos
  7. 17/05/1974 - 1 Car Bomb Monaghan Car stolen Armagh. UVF Possible
  8. 19/12/1975 - Car Bomb Kays Tavern Dundalk (Car Acquired Belfast) UVF
  9. 7/3/1976 – Car Bomb Castleblaney County Monaghan Car Stolen Belfast UVF Possible
  10. 21/5/1994 - Widow Scallan's Pub Dublin, Satchel Bomb UVF Failed explode
  11. Note 2,3, (6 Possible UVF with Help), 7,8, 9,10 All UVF

Now, there were other bomb explosions, not very many, going back to I think 1968, possibly. But the actual experience of car bombing in the south, and in the north as well, but I'm looking concentrating in the south here, was as infrequent as that. It didn't make it any less significant in terms of casualties, so they had no record, and no subversive organisation had ever succeeded in discharging three synchronised car bombs within four minutes.

It never happened, and most certainly the UVF didn't have the capacity to do that.

[Speaker 2] (24:11 - 24:23)

Okay, cool. Yeah, up to you. Where would you like to take us next?

Do you want to go into the logistics of the three in Dublin?

## Criminal Investigation Methodology

[Speaker 1] (24:23 - 31:46)

I think I should probably just do a little bit on the logistics, John. I've started looking at this quite a long time ago, because I've read everything, I've downloaded stuff and so on, but I would approach it from a criminal investigation technique point of view, John, where a lot of this is almost like a lawyer's discussion, or a politician's discussion, and you get into the blame game very easily. So, the three things any serious detective or investigator would do is, A, look for the motive for the particular crime, B, look at the opportunity, you know, did you have, were you approximate to the target, all of that, and the last one, the third one, is the bomb signature in this case, you know, what did it look like?

Now, I'm saying that for 1974, affirmatively the motive, **apart from to kill people, to be very clear on that, it's a mass murder, was to affect the political change of direction in the north.** There had been huge, there had been a huge problem in the north with a lot of the unionist community objecting and the Ulster Workers' Council strike to the power-sharing executive. So, there was a huge desire, plus the fact that Harold Wilson, the British Labour Prime Minister, was not popular with the security forces.

They saw him as being possibly soft on the republican side in the argument in the north. So, there was a very mixed political agenda, and when that power-sharing executive collapsed, it achieved, and it's a very cynical thing to say, but it's very accurate, it actually achieved a political objective that was removed from the unionist agenda in the north. Opportunity is very interesting because three cars used in Dublin were stolen in Belfast, or acquired, and I use the word acquired advisedly because there is some suggestion that at least one or more of the cars were volunteered for the Dublin operation, as distinct from being simply taken on the street by somebody stealing them, yeah.

So, that's certainly a real possibility. The other thing that's quite interesting is that they were all driven to Dublin wearing their original number plates. Now, that would be either extreme foolishness in normal circumstances, because the first thing would happen that you would change the number plates of the registration number, so to avoid early detection by any law enforcement, or alternatively, the operation had been planned so well that that factor was no longer an issue.

In other words, cover had been provided by either a slow and reporting the theft of the cars, or otherwise, to do that. So, and the opportunity goes through the north, because of the major disturbance in the north, there was Loyalist roadblocks all over the place, those roadblocks had to be negotiated. Now, the cars were driven to Dublin, that is unmistakable, whether they picked up the bombs enroute or not, and we'll get back to that in a second, I think it's more likely that the bombs, as in Dublin, were parcel bombs, that were actually a suitcase of a type, and we'll get on to the significance of that in a minute.

And also, the distance involved, and the amount of people involved. Now, we're talking about the logistics here.

## To do this Operation

At the very start of this, somebody called together a group of people and said, we are going to do this.

So, that is the planning meeting. And when you do that, from a military point of view, you have to go through the planning steps, you have to be able to say, where are we going to do it? What's the situation we're going to face when we get there?

And what do we hope to accomplish by it? And what do we need, what means do we need to do it with? So, there's a whole big process.

Ultimately, on the day of the attack<sup>2</sup>, a decision has to be made to go, we're going on this particular day, and an individual has to say, yes, this is what we're going to do. But a lot of advanced preparation has been done at that point, including reconnaissance in Dublin, looking at the areas, looking at escape routes, and plotting the way back. So, that's a big, big exercise.

And to accomplish it on the day, you would need at least 20 operatives, three cars, either one or two in each car, a scout car to escort them down. And if the explosives weren't traveling in the car, I think it's most likely for Dublin, and we're talking about Dublin here, that the explosives were pre-positioned or brought down by a separate transport on the day. And then they were loaded at one or more locations in Dublin into the actual bomb cars.

## BOMB SIGNATURE

So, you can see all of that's a very complicated one. And when we reflect back on that very poor skill, and we'll be talking to George Styles shortly in terms of what the skill of the UVF was, this was something that was way beyond their logistical capability. John, can I just mention the bomb signature?

And it's people, I can say people scratching their heads and saying, what does he mean by the bomb signature? The bomb signature is where forensic bomb investigators will look at a bomb and its characteristics, and it is almost like a DNA or a fingerprint of who has been involved. So, in this particular case, there are five elements that we're looking at.

---

Possible IVF)<sup>2</sup> The Trigger event

It's the explosives themselves, John, and I'll return to those in a minute. There's the detonators that are used. There is something called a timing and power unit.

Basically, think of it in terms of a timer that's going to set off the explosion. And because Dublin was done to such a degree of efficiency, there was something else called a safety and arming switch. In other words, it's a fail-safe switch.

And the last thing is the container. Now, I do want to mention the explosives that this is, John, if I may. In 1973, both the Provos and the loyalists had access to what we call ANFO.

## ANFO 1

I'm going to call it ANFO 1. It's an acronym that I'm going to use. It's ammonium nitrate and fuel oil.

In other words, it's a mix of ammonium nitrate, which is normally found in commercial fertilizer, with fuel oil. It's a process of mixing that's done, and that produces a kind of a paste. And that's called ANFO 1.

Now, that particular strength of ammonium nitrate was withdrawn in the south and in the north in 1973. The result of that was that the loyalists no longer had the capacity to do the same thing with the bombs as before. They would have to use alternative explosives, like commercial, if they had their hands on them or so on, which they apparently didn't have.

## ANFO 2

But the provisional IRA, and we'll return to this, had perfected a system, which I'm calling ANFO 2. That's ammonium nitrate fuel oil 2. The technical expression is, and this is Nigel Wyldes' description, is recrystallized explosives.

In other words, they had managed to beat the safety that had been built into removing the high content of ammonium nitrate. They had produced a different kind of explosives. It was still a paste, but now you didn't have to do something with the ANFO 1.

You had to put it in a container, like a beer keg or a milk churn, and it would only explode when it was in the container. Am I making myself clear, John?

[Speaker 2] (31:46 - 31:47)

Yes, absolutely.

[Speaker 1] (31:48 - 33:30)

But the new explosive, ANFO 2, which is the new recrystallized explosive, you could put that in a container, a box, a crate, a bag, and you didn't have to go to the cumbersome job of having the boot of your car and metal churn or a metal container rattling around. That's a very significant difference. Why is it different?

Because you could literally do the parcel on that. You could literally pick it up, hand it to, in other words, the people with access to the explosives. I don't want to mention it here.

I want to mention it a little later on. We'd hand it over to somebody to execute it. When they got to the car, you put your box or your bag or your satchel in the back of the car.

When you got to the point of adjacent to your target, the only thing you had to do was to set the safety and arming switch. What that did was it meant that when you went in to set the explosive in the trunk of your car, a simple wire made its way into the car itself, and you then deactivated the safety switch. Let's call it that for want of a better word.

It's number four in the list that I mentioned. That meant you got the hell out of the car as fast, but it gave you that double indemnity that you were no longer in danger of being exploded in your own bomb. That accounts for the remarkable explosive detonation, two minutes, two minutes in Dublin.

It's a very precise thing. Nobody had ever done it before, John, and nobody did it since. I mean, all subversives, neither of them had ever managed that synchronicity either before or since.

[Speaker 2] (33:30 - 34:10)

Very important point that this was such a unique attack in terms of how well oiled of a machine it was. You mentioned there, okay, so the different type of, we'll get to that, the different type of explosive is one thing that would suggest one type of collusion, given that they were given a type of explosive that they weren't used to. In terms of the synchronisation and the professionalism of it, was that something that you think the UVF was capable of at the time?

If not, who would have helped them then?

## Wilson briefing Cosgrave

[Speaker 1] (34:11 - 55:56)

Okay, John, can I return to that when I produce the Military Experts, because I think it's very important to make a point, but I want to return to it when I'm talking to George Styles and his friends, yeah? I just want to address one particular point, and that is in 1974, Harold Wilson, Prime Minister, Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave in London, and I think it was the 11th of September 1974, and they were obviously having a debrief on the overall security situation, but also on the Dublin and London bombings, and Harold Wilson told Liam Cosgrave, we have interned the culprits, we have interned the culprits, in other words, we've put them behind bars using an internment order, we don't have enough evidence to, you know, to arraign them before the courts, and this is the remarkable thing, and this is why there is a sovereign responsibility that we kind of return to at the end, is what did Dublin, and I'd rather say Ireland than Dublin, what did Dublin do with that information? Well, the short answer is, and this is recorded in the words of Judge Barron, who did a report commencing in 2000, and reporting in 2003, and yeah, they did absolutely nothing with it. Even the Minister for Justice, who was not present at that meeting, says he didn't know about it.

They had a government security committee, which had been specially set up to deal with the Northern situation and the security issue in the country. There is no minutes account of it ever being mentioned. Now, just think about that for a second, John.

## Judge Barron 2003 Criticises Dublin Government

The idea that you tell me that you know who committed this event, and I basically take my folder, I close it, I record it, and for 19 years, nothing happens until the Hidden Hand program comes along, but just in the context of what I've just said to you, John, Judge Barron was, and this is, these are three direct quotes from Judge Barron who held an inquiry on the government's behalf. It started in 2000, and there's other comments about that. Now, this is what he said about what I just said to you, John, which is that we had been told by the Brits, we know who did it, and we have interned them.

This is what the judge said. Notwithstanding the information supplied in the course of these meetings, there appears to have been no follow-through by any of those who became aware of it. Nothing was apparently raised at the meeting.

*Names were not sought, nor the evidence which justified the internment, nor allegation that they had been responsible for the Dublin bombing, unquote. Second quote, following the meetings, there is no evidence that the information was passed either to the Minister for Justice, or any of his officials, or indeed to the Garda Commissioner, or any other Gallaudet officer. Certainly, Patrick Cooney, the then Minister for Justice, was never made aware of it, nor is there any record of such information being passed to the Garda Siochana, unquote.*

*And the last quote, which is the most damning one of a lot, in my view, the absence of apparent interest in those interned, and in whatever evidence there was which indicated that some of them were involved in the Dublin bombing, strongly suggests that the Irish government made no efforts to assist the investigations into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings at a political level. It is also surprising that they did not convey this information to An Garda Siochana. Now, John, there's a bit of digestion involved in that, but this is what a retired Supreme Court judge in Dublin said about the governments in action arising from the Dublin bombings.*

## Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave Left no Public record

Liam Cosgrave, who was a Taoiseach, did not cooperate with the documentary, which we'll get onto in a second. Nor did he appear at the inquiries that were launched in Dublin, then subsequently in 2000. But that's kind of running ahead of myself.

**But John, I hope that's very clear. I had no idea of that. And I've been looking at this thing for quite a few years and talking to people and so on.**

But the most critical thing about this is the government itself and the subsequent inquiries, and in the anniversary coming up to the 50th, nobody from any government party or any party, for that matter, mentioned those three quotations from Judge Barron, which I consider remarkable. And I leave it to people themselves to decide why it was left just simply lie there. Well, yeah, it's quite extraordinary.

## Investigators Perspective

You see, and I'm looking at this now, John, as an investigator. Yeah. And it's like in take it to everyday terms of a crime being committed.

And somebody says, we know who did it. And then I just simply walked away. I mean, it's as drastic as that.

But maybe I should just kind of move forward to the next break. And there was very little comment in the Dáil, you know, on the anniversary. Very little, practically, I think only two or three.

## HIDDEN HAND DOCUMENTARY 1993

And that was in the years immediately after it. But something happened is that there was a journalist called Joe Tiernan. And there was a retired Irish colonel called John Morgan.

And they've all had a tremendous interest. But Joe Tiernan, in particular, because of his journalistic background, he did a tremendous amount of research. And between them, they convinced the Yorkshire Television to do a documentary in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings.

## First Class Research

And they broadcast that, I think, in July of 1993. And it was only after that that the UVF claimed responsibility. But the job of work that was done on that, from a research point of view, and I really appreciate it was done, was absolutely tremendous.

I mean, they got George Styles, who was the explosive expert. They got politicians. They got the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland at the time, Merlyn Rees, and a whole other thing.

And they put together an incredibly important documentary. And the other remarkable thing, John, and I served in the Garda Síochána at the time, is the Garda Síochána then, at that time, fully cooperated with the making of the programme. Now, I know how conservative my organisation was in 1993.

And the last thing the police would do would be volunteer information on anything. You know, it's like the Omerta. You just simply, it's private business.

You don't do it. They cooperated, and they opened the files that they had to the Hidden Hand. Now, that documentary film is available.

In other material that I've done on my website, jaorbrien.ie, you can actually hear excerpts from it, and I have the transcript of it, and so on. So now, what happened following that was, again, quite minimalistic, is that the UVF claimed responsibility. And I think in 1995, an organisation, or a loose organisation that became known as the JFF, Justice for the Forgotten, basically a group that was lobbying on behalf of the relatives who had been largely forgotten, or totally forgotten.

And one of the key things that they wanted, John, and this is very important, is they wanted to have a **full public sworn inquiry**. And that was largely based, if not exclusively based, on the Hidden Hand programme, and Joe Tiernan, John Morgan, and others who contributed at the time. And as we move from 1995, we're moving up to 1998.

## Good Friday Agreement but No to Public Sworn Inquiry

November 1998 is the Good Friday Agreement, so there's lots of talks going on between the British and the Irish. Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern, so there's a lot happening in the public space. But Dublin absolutely refused to have a sworn public inquiry.

They absolutely refused to have a sworn public inquiry. And they missed an incredible opportunity, because part of the 1998 Agreement was, there was unfinished business, particularly in the north, in relation to legacy crimes. John, I think you'll be aware of that.

So the Weston Park Agreement, I think, was in ~~2003~~ 2001. And the object of the Weston Park Agreement was to agree a number of cases, aggravated cases that, from the legacy perspective, needed to be further examined by way of sworn inquiries. And a number of cases were nominated in each jurisdiction, in each jurisdiction.

Pat Finucane case, the murder of Pat Finucane in the north, was one of the ones in the north. And the other one that was profound, and both governments agreed on this, John. So Dublin and London are hands together in this.

## Judge Corey<sup>3</sup>

They both agreed to cases that would go forward. Dublin agreed that there would be, that they would ask Judge Corey, he was a Canadian judge who came in to decide on the detail, but basically the governments were leading it anyway, decided that there should be probably a weak enough recommendation on the killings of Harry Breen and Bob Buchanan, the two RUC officers that were killed north of the border after a meeting in Dundalk, and the government in 2005 set that in frame.

**But the one thing that they should have done was, the most egregious crime committed in the history of the Troubles was the one that we're just talking about. And Dublin totally sidestepped that agreement. And it was the classic example, and we'd seen a little bit later on, that was a fundamental mistake.**

---

<sup>3</sup> More detail

## **Judge Henry Barron appointed to replace Judge Liam Hamilton**

So they had the opportunity of doing it, because this was the time when the washing was being taken care of. But what they did do is they decided on something quite different, which was really very ineffective. They appointed a high court judge, a retired Chief Justice Liam Hamilton, who became into bad health, and he was replaced with Judge Barron a retired Supreme Court judge.

Now that was not a sworn inquiry. It was basically one judge looking at it. He had no powers of substantial power, no powers of compelling.

He had no support in terms of logistical support. He was not able to hold any hearings in relation to oral hearings. And he had no expert forensic person or persons on it.

So he was depending on the intuitive qualities of legal training and so on. Now he did do what I mentioned to you earlier on in terms of looking at the government's record, and he did a very important service in doing that. Subsequently, the government appointed a Dáil subcommittee to look at what Judge Barron had said.

## **ARDAGH Committee**

So now you have an inquiry with no powers. Then we appointed a Dáil committee to look at the same thing, which I'm calling it the ARDAGH committee. That's the TD, the Member of Parliament who chaired it, and that was in 2003.

And that in turn appointed a subcommittee to look further at it, but it would addition they were moving further away from the truth. They were moving further away from the truth, and they also had very restricted terms of reference. At one occasion, the chair of one of the inquiries said that we're not here to discuss the issue of collusion and stopped the question being asked.

And the last thing that Dublin was is that they appointed Patrick MacEntee, who was a senior councillor and a Queen's councillor, to look at a very tight range of issues, which basically would revolve primarily around Garda and efficiency in investigation. **So every time that**

**they moved down the line, they moved further away from the fundamental point, you were told that the Brits told you that and all did it. But every time Dublin evaded that particular question, and they ignored the wonderful opportunity of Weston Park, where they could easily have got it included in that.**

## Secretary of State declined to attend

And then you would have a situation where Dublin was exercising its sovereign responsibility to vindicate the civil rights and the human rights of the people who were murdered on that day. And one last final thing before we move away from this is that the Ardagh Committee invited the Secretary of State from Northern Ireland, Paul Murphy at the time, to come and give evidence or share views with the committee. And the British are very good at giving the polite reply, a wonderfully worded reply, I have a copy of it.

He thanked them for their interest, wished them well with their inquiries, but then remarked that he was not in office at the time, which is clearly self-evident, because we're now talking about 2003, I guess. And that his predecessors, Peter Mandelson, was in no position to help. And the other Secretary of State, who was also one of that group, who was, oh, he was a Scottish guy, John Reid.

So, none of those would help. He wished them very well, did say that they had looked at an enormous amount of evidence, and they had gone through thousands of files, but they actually hadn't found anything that they could deem as being relevant. **Now, in essence, what was happening there, and has happened since, is they were being asked to wash their own linen.**

And so, it was not surprising that they couldn't find anything to be found on. So, that's kind of the history of the inquiries bit, and that's where it wound up with a zero-sum goal. So, that ended the inquiry phase at that stage.

## Military Experts Styles and Wylde

But almost immediately after that, but I'll get to that afterwards, John, because I want to go back to, if I may, to the military experts, because I think that's kind of key to the central

thesis. The political is a strand, and we'll return to it in a little while. As I mentioned at the outset, the expert military opinion on the Dublin bombings is extraordinarily important, and it goes to the template that I discovered in terms of motive, opportunity, and means.

In particular, it relates to the bomb signature. And the bomb signature I described earlier has five elements. The explosives, and I rely primarily on Styles and Wylde for that information, but Commandant Patrick Trears of the Irish military would be of a similar opinion.

Detonators involved, timing and power units in the trade referred to as TPUs, safety and arming switches, and then the container to contain the explosives. So, three military experts who were all serving at the time. I think that's very important that we're not talking about some people who are divorced from it, and we're talking about 1974.

So, it's in one's mind has to isolate that year. Lieutenant Colonel George Styles was awarded at George Cross by the British Royal Service in Northern Ireland. His biography is, the title of it is *Bombs Have No Pity*.

So, this man understood very well. Now, he's on a different perspective to our nationalist view or my nationalist view, but his words are very important. Patrick Trears was operating on the Irish side and was well familiar with the bomb situation along the border, and Nigel Wylde was also a lieutenant colonel in the ordnance aspect of the British Army, while the Royal Army Ordnance Corps.

Now, in the course of the interview with Hidden Hand, George Styles, and we have both the transcript, we have the video and the audio of this interview, and he's being asked about his opinion of the expertise of the UVF. And this is what he said, to put one bomb on wheels together, you have to have a fair amount of training and expertise. To get three to go off all at the same time, you've got to have some pretty good technicians organising the timing mechanisms, for instance.

The organisation of getting three cars into the centre of the city, all going off roughly at the same time, that smacks of some pretty good administrative ability, and whatever organisation, therefore, that was behind this outrage, you could say they were not low down on the learning curve, they were high up on it. And then he's asked the next question, which

is kind of a logical follow-on, and he says, I have no high regard for their skills, referring to the UVF in 1974, I don't think they were at a level that would equate to that sort of techniques that were used here in Dublin.

#### Next question.

*What about the loyalist history of synchronised car bombing, and at that stage he actually laughs. I don't think there was one. In my view, they had not done that sort of thing, as I say, it was outside their field of technology, unquote.*

*Next quotation. He was asked, could this be a covert military operation by UK Armed Forces, but added in my view, which is based on experience of such operations, that is extremely unlikely. And then the follow-up question to that by the interview was, but did such operations mean that the British Army covertly detonated their own bombs?*

*The question, which is worth repeating, **did such operations mean that the British Army covertly detonated their own bombs?** And his answer was, I don't think without breaking the Official Secrets Act, or getting somebody to break it, you're never going to get any information about every operation that goes on covertly, whether it involves setting a bomb off, or whether it doesn't. And then he goes on to qualify, because the question was, does that mean the British were setting off their own bombs, and he further amplifies his answer.*

*No. I think I would say, if somebody said to me, we want you to set off a bang tonight, so that we can go and have a look at whatever, and because the bang would be allied to an IRA explosion, and therefore wouldn't be other than a normal occurrence, it would be unthinkable to an operation such as that to use other than captured IRA materials.*

**Last question. So the British military were carrying out explosives.**

Well, there could have been, no reason why they shouldn't, if that was a way of getting information.

This is the man who got a George Cross for his service dealing with explosives in Belfast. Top man on the pyramid at that particular stage in 19...

Well, he left in 1972, but he's talking about what happened then.

And the next man who has the equally important role in this, and probably more equal, because he came on the scene subsequent to George Styles. He was asked questions, and he supplied two very good reports to the Justice for the Forgotten JFF, and I'm grateful that they provided me with those reports.

But this is what he says about Dublin now. He has much longer reports, much more detailed and highly important information on the intelligence. This is what he says about the bombs.

And he says, the videos provide photographic evidence of almost certain use of ANFO.

Now, in this case, I'm calling that ANFO 2 in all of the three Dublin bombs. There is no new evidence to change my view that the Monaghan bomb comprised of a homemade low explosive contained in the beer keg.

And that's what I'm calling ANFO 1. There are two main potential sources of ANFO. One is high content ammonium nitrate fertilizer prilles mixed with fuel oil.

And two, recrystallized ANFO 2 obtained from confiscated stocks.

**MONAGHAN = ANFO 1**  
**DUBLIN = ANFO 2**

It is difficult from the evidence available to be absolutely certain, but in my view, the presence of what appears to be CLUMPS of ANFO at the site of all three Dublin bombs would indicate that the use of recrystallized ANFO. This in turn would suggest that the source was confiscated stocks.

Now, he says elsewhere in his report that at that particular time in Northern Ireland, they were seizing a thousand pounds of this new highly crystallized ANFO in Belfast and roughly the same amount in each of the other two brigade areas in Northern Ireland. And he said, and this is incredibly important, because for the obvious reasons,

## NO RECORDS OF SEIZURES OR DESTRUCTION

we kept no records of the seizures  
and we kept no records of the disposition.

**Now, when you do a conjunction between what George Steins has said a minute ago,**

I could see no problem in letting off a bomb for the right reasons, as he would describe it. And I could see no problem in using any other than confiscated explosives. You can see that, to put it mildly, there was a singular question mark over what became of the seized explosives. And it would have taken very little of that to go astray, either deliberately or otherwise, to cause the Dublin explosions.

So, that is quite amazing. That's quite an amazing statement from him. Now, he's a much wider reporter and I deal with that in a little while.

Now, and I finish this little section by saying, what we've said at the start, the UVF, acting alone, did not possess the technical, the operational, or organisational capacity to execute the Dublin car bombings.

**And that's not based on speculation,**

- but on a layered accumulation of forensic findings, like the ones I've been describing to you, expert military testimony, the ones I've given you,
- comparison with the meagre UVF's historical bombing record, and
- analysis of the sophisticated planning required for the Dublin operation,
- the size of the team involved,
- the wreckage involved, the transport involved,
- all of that redundancy measures that would have to go into the escape from that.

So, there is much, much more information available, obviously, but that is the key. And that information was never successfully interrogated at a forensic or an investigatory level by any of the inquiries launched by Dublin, because they were not set up to do it.

And it's no criticism of Judge Barron, or of the Ardagh Committee, or of Patrick MacEntee, but they were simply given terms of reference and powers that didn't allow any of this to happen, even though it was obvious that there was a major issue. So, that's kind of the expert military evidence, John.

[Speaker 2] (55:56 - 56:19)

Just to reiterate, yeah, that's one very, very strong string in the bow of this case, was that the explosives they used weren't used previously by them, and weren't used again. And that same fingerprint, if you will, that was created, wasn't found again in later UVF bomb attacks.

[Speaker 1] (56:19 - 1:07:38)

## After the Inquiries

The bit I just wanted to move on to, John, if it's okay with you, is what happened post the inquiries that happened from 2000 to 2007. Dublin had a belated change of heart, and it started to ask the British for information. Now, considering they had the Weston Park Agreement, which would have allowed them to put the domestic single biggest terrorist attack in the Troubles right into the post-Weston Park Agreement, part of the Good Friday set up, and of course, I mentioned to you earlier that Paul Murphy, the Secretary of State, and his two previous colleagues declined to, in 2004, to attend in Dublin.

## DUBLIN APPEALS TO THE BRITISH

Now, 10th of July 2008, Dáil Eireann unanimously called on the British government. They did the same again in 2016, 2011 and 2016. They did the same in 2012.

2017, the Minister for Foreign Affairs made the same plea. And the 14th of May 2024, they made the same plea to the Brits, will you please tell us everything that you know about the

Dublin and Monaghan bombings, and any other of the issues of relevance. And of course, what the British do with great class is they ignore everything.

They just simply, they simply smile and said, no, dear boy, we can't possibly tell you all that. We have done everything we've done, and that's it. So the Dublin end of this was missing one vital cog, which we will return to later.

But that's been the history after, like the horses well bolted from the stable at this stage, in terms of getting the information. So that's that political action. But I just want to comment, John, if I may, if you're okay, time-wise, I want to comment on what has been the British strategy in terms of what has been happening.

In other words, how did they, as an organisation, deal with the publicity relating to Dublin and the queries from people along the way, and for the families and court cases? How did they deal with it? And is that okay with you, John?

## British have a long-term political and security strategy.

Absolutely. Yeah, take it away. Now, the British have a long-term political and security strategy.

In the political level, they will always appear to be amenably helpful, politely, absolutely never admitting anything, and then they will progressively change the rules to make it harder to get at the information. By that I mean, in 2005, they changed the rules for sworn inquiries in England to make it more restrictive, and that's after the Weston Park Agreement. Then we had the most recent things when they went through the legacy legislation.

Again, to restrict the amount of the stories that would be available, and I'll get to the UK Supreme Court in a minute.

But they have always had a doctrine, not a law, called NCND.

What is he talking about?

Neither confirm nor deny.

In other words, it happened, and I've been mentioning Scappaticci and KENOVA in a short few minutes.

That has been a security doctrine.

## UK Supreme Court

But very lately, this year, the UK Supreme Court has made a decision in what is called the Thompson case. It arose from a coroner's inquiry in the north, where the coroner wanted to give the families of the deceased, the murdered deceased, a gist of the information available. A gist is just like a summary without certain information missing from it.

The UK Supreme Court said that it was the Secretary of State's authority. It could be released. The Secretary of State made the application to the Supreme Court.

Now the situation is, that case taken by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland was successful in the Supreme Court. Now it means that anyone, any of the agents, anyone where the British claim that there has been a security or political imperative, may not be forced to release. There is a huge consequence from that.

## CLOSING THE DOOR ON INFORMATION

That's why I say, progressively, they have managed to narrow the gate. Just moving on from that, John, there's been a legal trajectory. By 2025, Northern Ireland had shifted decisively from investigation-led accountability towards state-managed containment.

That's what we're just referring for. They would tell you what they wanted to tell you, and they wouldn't tell you that the Supreme Court case in Thompson confirmed that.

The Brits have always been good at controlling the narrative.

## GASLIGHTING 1

They're extremely good. **They use what I call gaslighting. They express, they make an assertion on the basis that it's supported by facts.**

They do it with all of the solemnity of a public statement. Now, they define the rules, and they're quite happy at this stage to identify individuals as being responsible for collusion or crimes, but they're absolutely adamant that there is no corporate responsibility.

John Boutcher, who's a current Chief Constable at PSNI, has been a key part of that decision.

*Unfortunately, Dublin has been either wittingly or unwittingly complicit in relation to that because Dublin and Monaghan should not have been farmed out to the neighbours for investigation or review. That's absolutely an incredible fact. There is no other country.*

The British wouldn't do it for OMAGH, or they wouldn't do it for Enniskillen, and they'd be right. This is our responsibility. On the 14th of January, the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee discussed the Operation KENOVA report and some passing mention of Denton.

Again, it was, what would you say, John? An anodyne discussion. There is very little, how would I put it, nationalist opinion there by way of members of parliament because we know one party in Northern Ireland don't attend Westminster.

## The role of Jon Boutcher

It's available online and people can look at it and so on. I want to hit something more important for me. I'd always been intrigued with the role of Jon Boutcher, who is a very distinguished and competent British police officer with a very strong track record behind him.

He became involved in 2016 in investigating the alleged links between Freddy Scappaticci and the British military agent known as Stakeknife. He appeared down here in Dublin and other places at meetings. He's a very calm, quite mellifluous individual.

I made it my business to contact him during one of the commemorations, anniversaries for the Dublin bombings. We arranged to meet. Again, his manners were impeccable.

We met and we discussed. I put to him directly the following. I said, look, John, it's great to meet us, but I believe that the UVF didn't have the capability we're speaking on.

He assured me, blind as a bat, yes, we do. We have all the information on it. Then he was quietly said, by the way, this is in the book, so this is not a new disclosure in that sense.

He said, no, I have the information, but I'm not the expert on it. I'll get one of my colleagues to brief you on it. I said, great.

In the meantime, he had moved on from his KENOVA position. He became the acting Chief Constable of the PSNI. I contacted the relevant KENOVA office.

Many occasions, the expert never appeared. Then, lo and behold, on the 28th of October this year (2025) the Operation Denton is the bit of the Northern legacy operation that he was running and now run by Sir Ian Livingstone, former police chief in Police Scotland. There was a leak in the Belfast newspaper.

## Podcast by Belfast Telegraph.

There was also a podcast by Belfast Telegraph. It leaked, in inverted commas, the findings of the Denton report. One of the key findings in that was the loyalists had the capability of committing bomb explosions.

Now, that isn't quite the same thing as saying they had the capability of doing the Dublin explosion. There is a difference and so on. Then laterally, on the 9th of December, the final KENOVA report, ~~and it's well in the north and in the UK~~, was reported on the findings, which are basically laughable in relation to Stakeknife and Freddy Scappaticci.

He's mentioned throughout the report, but the Brits won't allow the report to say that Scappaticci and Stakeknife are one and the same person.

## Job Boutcher Doubles Down on UVF Bombing Capability

John Boutcher, who was present at that launch, then again gave the alleged findings from Denton, without a report. In other words, he repeated the assertion that the UVF had the capacity to do it, produce absolutely no evidence, and also said that the report itself, in other words, where the substantive information was, would be published at some time in the future.

It's unlikely that it will be. The key thing on that, and I hope I'm not losing people here, is John Boutcher is an enigmatic individual, and he's a very good person of manner, but he repeatedly asserts that he has no jurisdiction in the Republic. He accepted the Dublin Monaghan Mass Murder, even though it was obviously, clearly, unmistakably committed in the Republic by any yardstick.

In relation to another aspect of what he was doing, he sent British police officers to retired Garda homes looking for information. He held a conference in the Cooley Peninsula, in the south, looking for the same kind of cooperation from the retired guards. He was initially, as I said, the officer in overall charge of Kenova, then he went on to Denton as part of it, and he is now the chief constable of the PSNI.

He made the same remarks that he made to me in 2003, that were alleged in the Belfast Telegraph leak, and then he made those same remarks KENOVA launch on December 9th, **without a single shred or scintilla of evidence to support them.**

So, pardon me if I find this an absolutely mind-boggling, heart-stopping moment, you know, where you can do that without ever possibly having any responsibility for what you're saying by making that assertion. The last thing I want to say about this, John, is the review in the north of the Dublin Monaghan bombings as part of the Denton inquiries is, they call it this, and it's very important, they call it a **thematic review, not a criminal investigation.**

Now, I interpret that meaning is that they do a paper review. In other words, anything that has happened already, they review. They don't do anything with information like that, I said already, you know, in relation to the explosives, and what their own officers, British Army officers said.

**And Dublin had gone on with this charade for ages**, obviously, and now they're in the unenviable position that the road is over as far as the Brits are concerned, and now Dublin, because of Supreme Court decision, the UK have nowhere to go. So what will Dublin do now? They can't appeal to the Brits to tell them everything they know, because the Brits have said, well, you know what, show's over, we've moved on.

So this is a very, very unsatisfactory situation. But it is major constitutional questions for Dublin, in terms of what goes forward. So that's probably as much as I want to say on that, John.

[Speaker 2] (1:07:39 - 1:08:02)

**Can I stop you there? Just on the KENOVA and Denton finding**, I think this was Denton, but they named the members of the UVF that they assert did the bombing, one of them being a guy called William Frenchy Marchant. Do you have any reason to doubt who they said did it?

## Gaslighting 2

[Speaker 1] (1:08:02 - 1:08:16)

Well, this is typical of the gaslighting thing. They didn't name him at the inquiry. He was named in the gaslighting leak that was made to the Belfast Telegraph.

He was not named in the inquiry.

[Speaker 2] (1:08:17 - 1:08:19)

OK, how did his name get out?

[Speaker 1] (1:08:20 - 1:09:25)

Because his name is in documents going back for 30 years. The Loyalist Lobby, which obviously there are some of them still there, and this is regrettable. His family went to court to ensure that his good name wasn't impugned.

And that allowed John Boutcher to go to the 9 December when they were doing the KENOVA thing to make the (alleged) findings from Denton (public), but not the foundation

which would have included William Merchant's name or Billy Merchant's name. So it defies description. It absolutely defies description.

**But it is part of what is the gaslighting and disinformation strategy**, which is they'll acknowledge in the British strategy, will acknowledge some things, will make sure that it stays on the ground floor. And if it looks like that we're losing the game, we will then change the rules of the game so that that information can't be used anyway. So it's a very, very strange situation.

A very, very strange situation.

[Speaker 2] (1:09:27 - 1:10:01)

Does that clear that for you, John?

Very good. I might bring it back to the question of, OK, there's obviously the aspect of collusion where the explosives, by your assertion, were given to the UVF by the British Army or by some kind of intermediary that they would use.

There's also the planning and the kind of synchronicity of the attack itself. Do you think they got help in terms of how to plan it and reconnaissance and all that kind of thing? Or did they do that and the explosives were given to them

[Speaker 1] (1:10:02 - 1:16:56)

I've always had a view of using an expletive to describe the capacity of the UVF at this stage. Just going to give you some information which is quite relevant. In 1974, the British Army had security and privacy in the north, not the police.

And we know from Nigel Wylde that the that the military and from other colonels as well, that there was a particular affinity, which is not unnatural between the military and the Loyalist community, because they were natural allies against IRA. Many different people in the British employ at the time, they said they knew what the Loyalists were up to. But I specifically want to say is Nigel Wylde, in part of his report that he provided, related to the intelligence and weapons intelligence function in 1972 to 1977.

## British Army intelligence gathering

Now, that's a big mouthful. But what he was actually saying is that there was a very sophisticated British Army intelligence gathering operation in the north from covert sources, from human intelligence, that's agents and informers, from signal intelligence, interceptions and electronic intelligence, bugging, all of that, from technical intelligence, which relates, in this case, related to the bombs. And in addition, they had military intelligence officers, MIOs, or field intelligence, non-commissioned officers, were located at various levels of the RUC and I presume special ranks, so they were able to report any significant information.

They were also able to pass that back to the RUC. Now, let no one tell me, John, that after this big explosion in Dublin and Monaghan, that that particular structure wasn't activated or aware of what was happening. We know that it brought it down.

Fred Holroyd and Colin Wallace were saying is that the local UVF were in bed with them, and in effect were running them, and that they were part of the thing. So the British had a highly sophisticated system of intelligence gathering, and they ran agents, and there's a whole other series of stuff that we probably don't have time to go into today, but they had that kind of technical ability, so they knew what was happening. So when we talk about collusion, actually, the best authority on collusion, ~~apart from John O'Brien, I wouldn't end with a glass,~~ it would be Ann Cadwallader, who has written a book called Lethal Allies, and that is an enormously forensic takedown on the, what is referred to as the murder triangle, you know, the area of the Glenanne gang and stuff and so on.

## Importance of Forensic Information

It just, and it's very dispassionate because it deals with both loyalist and republican violence and killings, you know, it deals with Reaveys, and it deals with O'Dowds, but it also deals with Kingsmill, in terms of referencing and so on, and the very important thing that they did, which is, there's often big debates on collusion, and I intend to talk about it in a minute if I may, but the **forensic information has often been ignored**, and that's why I went down the bomb technology bit in this, is to take it to some degree away from the debates that are turned out to debates, to go to the more certainty of the forensic information. For instance, in

relation to a lot of the killings, there is a forensic trail, like the, if we take the Kingsmill massacre, those weapons were used in many subsequent cases after that by IRA, and the same would be true of many other cases, so there's a footprint of it that comes forensically, so that's the bit that underscores the allegations of collusion, and most certainly there was collusion on a rampant scale, and it is a terrible thing to say because I know personally many members of the RUC and worked across them and with them, and they're fine, decent people, and I mean, I have read the personal accounts of the individual family officers that were in absolutely horrendous time, but unfortunately there was that system in place, and the key thing that's always missed in relation to informers and collusion is the agents, and let's look at the example of the agents, John, that they were using as part of their system.

You had a guy known as the Jackal, Robin Jackson, he was the key UVF guy, killer in Mid-Ulster, Freddie Scappaticci, otherwise Stakeknife, Peter Keely, Kevin Fulton, who we haven't discussed in this particular episode, we could easily spend a time talking about him, but each of those three guys, but let's, for the purpose of this exercise, look at the Jackal, Robin Jackson, and Stakeknife, Freddie Scappaticci, were all part of a formal British structure, Stakeknife in particular, yeah, so that meant there's a tiered series of command above that individual, so these guys aren't like guys who certainly says I'm going to be helpful for the army, these guys who are part and parcel of the setup, paid for, I mean Scappaticci was spirited off to the UK, houses bought from, and his will is sealed in the British records at the moment, and I'm told that the only wills that are sealed normally in the UK are those of royalty, he died two years ago now, so like the idea of collusion being kind of a random activity undertaken without any contact with the official British organisation, military organisation, or intelligence organisation, is simply wrong, it is simply wrong, but yes, going back to the idea of the explosives being handed over, when you take the George Styles information for a legitimate purpose, we would only use captured IRA explosives for that purpose, because that's where the blame would be, obviously, and it would allow us to do other things, it's a very, very short jump to go to that from saying is, because we didn't keep any records of the explosives, that we didn't keep any records of their destruction, it is a very easy thing to say, considering the terrible ferment that was in the North in 1974 and 1972 and so on, that some of that was made available. Now, there's no doubt that the organisational brain, because remember there's somebody at the top of this triangle, John, who organised it, who got the people together and did it, had a military type training, who understood the logistics of it, understood the planning, and then I have no doubt that the UVF were happy

gophers to do this to Dublin, to commit this mass murder in Dublin and in Monaghan, but that the organisational brain is not something that belonged with UVF or any other terrorist organisation for that matter.

**So that's why I feel that on the balance of probability, it's reason to draw the conclusion that there was other help available to the UVF and that has had to be either military or rogue military elements.**

[Speaker 2] (1:16:57 - 1:17:13)

Okay, so the actual form that this would take would be like this agent who works for the British government, British army, security forces, actually meeting with these UVF men and actually planning it out.

[Speaker 1] (1:17:14 - 1:19:02)

**Yeah, the military individual, rogue or otherwise, would have come up with a plan in response to a demand or in response to a perceived need, and then would have looked on the way of what resources do I need to do this? And what is my objective? I want to defeat the power sharing executive that's happening in Belfast, the first time since the foundation of the state, the first time since the border was put.**

I want to stop this because this is against British security interests, against British interests. So now I have very highly specialised equipment and information available. I take that idea, I need some assistance from some colleagues, and I formed a plan.

And I discovered that it is possible to do the suitcase with the new ANFO 2 explosive, and it takes very little then to go into the next stage, which is provided to the loyalists. I mean, it is well established the only purpose of the loyalist explosive devices, they never gave warnings, was to kill. I mean, and they're quite different from the provisional IRA on some occasions, not on others, in relation to that.

So then you put together the team and you do it as a military-type operation. But of course, John, just like the foot soldiers in the First World War, you'd be very happy to send the foot soldiers into the shooting line, but you would have devised a plan that got them there, and

you would have devised a plan that got them out of there, because why? If for any reason there was a problem and they were caught, they could blow the whole caboose.

So that military part of the component would be at that level, but certainly they would be more than happy to let the willing hands of the UVF, either from Belfast or Portadown or any combination of the two, to do it.

[Speaker 2] (1:19:03 - 1:19:39)

Okay, very good. Okay, this is kind of like a hypothetical question that I think will get aspects of the attack explained by you. If someone came along to you and said, look, whatever about the explosive, I don't think that simply planting three cars with bombs in them in Dublin and getting them to go off like kind of a round about at the same time, I don't think that's a difficult thing to do.

I don't think it would require that kind of expertise, just the case of leaving three cars somewhere. What would you argue against that point,

I would say?

[Speaker 1] (1:19:40 - 1:21:53)

Well, I would say if that is your position, then show me the same information that I've showed you. Explain to me why you think it's possible. And by the way, when you're doing that, explain where it has happened before and where it's happened since.

And where does this synchronicity come from? Who has devised this synchronicity? And how did it happen?

Just RUN ME THROUGH IT, that was the offer that I made to John Butcher. I said, John, look, if I'm wrong, and it would be a good thing to be wrong, because if I'm right, that this is the more reasonable proposition, then it means that this killing was state-organised or by agents either acting on behalf of or acting from within that framework that committed this horrendous mass murder. So it would be much better, not better for the poor unfortunate victims, it would be much better that it was capable of being done.

## Logic

So really, it's the reasons that we mentioned at the start, John, that makes it irrelevant, that particular proposition irrelevant, which is the logic.

That is, there's a layered accumulation of forensic findings, there's expert military testimony, there's a comparison with the UVF's historical bombing record, and there's an analysis of the sophisticated planning required for the Dublin operation. So after all of these questions, if my hypothetical interviewer says, John, listen, come on, I mean, look at you, you're having a bit of a rave here.

I'd say, fine, answer each of those questions in a way that solves the equation, just like if we were doing it in geometry, don't go, John, you know, you go work your formula, go through each of those five, go through each of those five components, and then explain to me. And of course, provide a bigger example, like if you became so good so suddenly, like the killing in Northern Ireland lasted all the way up to 1998. And then some subsequently as in Omagh, why on earth, if you had suddenly become this good, that you didn't, that you didn't exercise it again?

Can you imagine the effect if you put it outside Gerry Adam's house? If you put it outside the Sinn Féin office on the Falls Road, or the Sinn Féin office in 44 Parnell Square in Dublin?

I mean, you would have absolutely brought these guys to their knees, because their own population wouldn't have, wouldn't have supported them. So I'd say something along those lines, John, apart from maybe something more direct as well.

[Speaker 2] (1:21:54 - 1:22:48)

Okay, yeah. So yes, at some point, what I'm considering is that, yeah, bombs are obviously indiscriminate weapons. So they will quite happily blow up the person who drove it down quite as easily as they'll blow anyone else up.

And the point of this being that you need to get your fellas away from the bomb. Obviously, give yourself enough time, so that you're in a safe distance. But you also probably don't want to be leaving the thing too early on the street, either.

There's kind of, there's kind of like an ideal, an ideal window there to be struck. On that note, when do you think, when do you think like the bombs had their timers set? And they were probably, I mean, because it is, it is kind of risky, like you're kind of relying on there not being some kind of delay that delays you getting the car into the place you want.

## Safety and Arming Unit

[Speaker 1] (1:22:49 - 1:25:59)

Yeah, the key issue on that one, John, is this device that I mentioned to you already, which is the timing, the safety and arming unit. And that's like, think of it, my hand I'm holding up now is one timer, yeah? And the second hand, if I can manage it, is the second one.

Now, the first one I held up won't activate until I deactivate. So I have one up. Come on over here.

I have one up. I have two up. Now, the first one I put up will not activate until I remove the first one.

So it's like, obviously, it's a double lock. Yeah? It's a double lock.

So I can do all my preparations in safety. Yeah? Because this is well-known technology.

It's a high quality stuff. I'm at no risk. And the only time I'm at a risk is that if the safety and arming unit was to malfunction, but there are other ways of checking the circuit, because essentially, think of it as a circuit, just like we have a wire running around our house, all these elements are in that circuit.

Yeah? And so it's like a double lock. And the last thing that's removed is when I park the car is I unlock the first of the double locks, which in turn activates the timer for the second.

So that's the critical timing difference between A and B. Yeah? And it gives me time to leave the car.

So it's a question of discretion as to what I would do. But when you look at the four minute window in Dublin, John, that is quite extraordinary. There have been hundreds and hundreds of car bombs in the North, car bombs in the UK, car bombs on the continent, but particularly in the UK and Ireland at least in those days.

**Nobody has ever managed to do the one, two, three. It hasn't happened. So there's a reason for that.**

Unless you have a military type setup where you can do the double lock. There's a, by the way, one of the contributors to this **thing was a former bomb squad guy in New York**, who was a former Korean veteran. And he was being asked by one of the interviewers in relation to this, you know, what was it?

Give him the information. And he said, what is your take on it? And his take on it was that you needed a military type timing unit to give you the additional safety so that you didn't fall into the trap.

**But it was the key thing on this, John, is like you and I are now asking this question, or I am asking these questions many years removed. The time for those questions to be asked and answered was in Dublin in the year 2000, when we should have set up a sworn inquiry for the Dublin Monaghan bombings. Instead, we set up on very specious grounds an inquiry into the other killing of Harry Breen and Bob Buchanan.**

Not that their killing didn't deserve investigation. So that's when the questions were asked. But there was no capacity within Judge Barron or within the other committee, and certainly not Paddy McEntee, to ask those questions.

They simply didn't have it.

[Speaker 2] (1:26:00 - 1:26:05)

Was there any other aspects of this you wanted to go over? Have we covered everything, do you think?

## Britain has closed the Door on information release

[Speaker 1] (1:26:06 - 1:29:08)

Just two quick things, John, I think, and there's always something more, but I think the plain thing is, **I mentioned the UK Supreme Court being out, closing the door, yeah? Because they neither confirm or deny. But there's consequences for Dublin this.**

Continued Irish political support for the UK's controlled legacy mechanism is no longer neutral. You know, up to now, we have been saying things from Dublin, like we look forward to the report from Kenova and from Operation Denton. But now we can say, after the UK Supreme Court, that that trust shouldn't be there anyway, but that trust is no longer a neutral position.

**Those mechanisms are objectively incapable of delivering full truth, and the continued reliance on them places the Irish state in dependency on a foreign sovereign that has asserted secrecy as an lawful state.**

**That's the post-Thompson decision in the Supreme Court. In other words, they had lopped off the exercise, and we committed ourselves in Dublin to allowing them to wash our linen, which should never have happened.**

No country would do it. So there is another obligation, I think. Now, this is more a lawyers question than mine, John, but I think it's worthy of consideration.

The protection of life is something within this state's jurisdiction. The effective investigation of mass murder certainly belongs here. And there's accountability when the state fails to discharge those obligations.

Now, the representation of a citizen's interest in dealing with foreign governments is something that has to be addressed. And there is, of course, now compliance with

international human rights, **Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and so on. So the Dublin state's obligations rests on.**

You cannot just simply say, hey, guys, it's over. And I have yet to see a policy statement from Dublin which says something very simple like, we have decided that. And this is the reasons why we haven't investigated it here according to the same terms of reference that we would apply to anything else from a sworn inquiry point of view.

## Exception to the Rule of NOT doing our own investigation

**By the way, there's one exception to the rule. The UVF exploded a car bomb in Belturbet in December of 1972. The Irish state did support an investigation into that and gave it a lot of publicity.**

## WHY BELTURBET? And NOT DUBLIN AND MONAGHAN

And there's nothing wrong with that. But would someone tell me, and I've asked the question of people who should know, why Belturbet? Why not Dublin and Monaghan?

And there is no good answer. Now, somewhere in all of this, John, there's a dark and murky secret lurking in the political background of 1974. That's the near side.

That's this question of many people. How come there was so little reaction from Dublin? How come that they weren't absolutely jumping up and down?

## Secret

And there is a dirty secret lurking somewhere at the back of that. And I wish somebody, before I pass on from this mortal coil, but not for me, but for the victims, would simply say, well, this is why we didn't do it, because it's unmistakable they didn't do what they should have done.

[Speaker 2] (1:29:09 - 1:29:14)

This is a secret in the Irish government. You're not talking about the Northern Irish.

[Speaker 1] (1:29:16 - 1:32:02)

No, I suspect that it is something to do with intergovernmental contact between Dublin and London. What Harold Wilson is saying is, I'm trying to keep a lid on stuff here. And the other part of that logic is, and there's a certain amount of sense to it, is that the biggest enemy to both our states is, not the loyalists, but the provisional IRA.

So we need to devote our attention to the provisional IRA. Now, if that is the case, that might explain why there was silence along the way, but basically silence all the way. And why the terms of reference were so meagre in terms of Dublin, because the easiest thing in the world is to write a set of terms of reference that are wide in scoping.

So it allows ~~antecedents in~~ the process that we can compel witnesses, have expert evidence from people who know what they're talking about from a technical point of view. So yeah, it's an extraordinary omission. Now, John, I don't expect anyone who's going to phone call is going to ring after you go on the air with this and say, John, we've discovered what this is.

But I have posited that with senior diplomats who were involved at the time. And if a nod is as good as a wink, I think I have a fair idea that there was something in that interaction between Dublin and London. And then as years went on, it became more difficult.

## Convenient scapegoat

And when the hidden hand program came about in 1993, now this is the uncomfortable truth. And the convenient scapegoat that was used after that was the guard investigation was wound down too soon, and therefore the baddies couldn't be caught. Now in my book, I deal with that very directly.

And because I was a guard, I have always been careful that I can't accuse me. He'd say that because he was. I think it's very simple.

All of the culprits were in the north. The cars were stolen in the north. In order to make them amenable to the court, A, they have to be interviewed.

B, you have to have an extradition process. And when you extradite somebody from another country to Dublin, you already have to have all your evidence in place. You can only bring them before the court to charge.

And that's generally understood. It's not a question, you get me in Belfast, you bring me down, you ask me other questions. If you're happy with my answer, no, you have to have your full case.

Now that requires the compliance of the governments, of the legal authorities. And frankly, doing that in the context of 1974 and all of the things that happened, and we covered this ~~in our things~~, It would have been a very tall ask. It would have been a very tall ask.

So the idea of using the guards as a scapegoat was a convenient way. But I have heard no senior politician, and I'm not going to name them, although I feel like in the 2000s saying, you know what? It was a major mistake.

We should have followed up on the information that Harold Wilson gave in Liam Cosgrove. Didn't happen.

[Speaker 2] (1:32:02 - 1:32:33)

Yeah. And your book, like you just mentioned, I should have mentioned in the beginning, you've written an excellent and well laid out book about this called The Great Deception. You can probably find it on your website.

We'll put the link in the podcast notes and the YouTube description. So unless there's anything else you'd like to leave the audience with, I think that's an excellent laying out of the case. Just to reiterate that the UVF could not, in fact, have acted alone in the Dublin Monaghan mass murders.

[Speaker 1] (1:32:35 - 1:32:58)

John, I've did the best to lay it out as objectively as I can. And the questions that I've laid out really deserve answering. And we really have to get over our naivety on intelligence matters in Dublin and understand the nature of the business.

We can be friends with everyone, but we shouldn't be fools to our neighbours either. So again, thank you for the opportunity, John. Really appreciate it.

And so let's see what happens.

[Speaker 2] (1:32:59 - 1:33:06)

Absolutely. Thank you very much. I'd love to speak again and do an interview maybe on just your general career as a guard during this time.

[Speaker 1] (1:33:07 - 1:33:27)

Yeah, John, I would be very happy to do that. And somewhat like it's not as deadly serious of what we're doing now, because many of it is really the strange and unusual human nature that you meet and so on. And you get an opportunity to do a lot of good, not that often, but occasionally.

So yeah, I'd be very happy to do that when and if the opportunity presents itself.